Towards a Constitutional Framework for the Caretaker Government in the Jordanian Constitutional System: An Analytical Study in Light of the Constitutional and Legal Oversight
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59759/law.v5i2.1893Keywords:
Caretaker Government, Government Dismissal, Political OversightAbstract
This research, titled "Towards a Constitutional Framework for the Caretaker Government in the Jordanian Constitutional System," addresses a critical issue in constitutional law, focusing on the framework of the temporary government tasked with managing the daily affairs of the state in the event of a political vacuum, such as the resignation of the government or the dissolution of parliament. The study argues that a caretaker government is a necessary transitional phase to ensure the continuity of public services and to prevent a legal vacuum, thus maintaining political and administrative stability in the state.
In the Jordanian context, the research highlights the absence of clear constitutional provisions defining the powers of the caretaker government, raising concerns about its legitimacy and the limits of its authority. The study also examines the mechanisms of oversight on the actions of the caretaker government, whether through parliamentary, presidential, or judicial control, while also exploring comparative practices in countries like France and Iraq. The research concludes by emphasizing the need to clearly define the powers of the caretaker government in the Jordanian Constitution, along with strengthening judicial oversight to ensure that such a government does not exceed its designated authority. It advocates for the establishment of constitutional principles that govern this transitional period, ensuring the stability and sovereignty of the state.
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References
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